Case
Julia Wallace, Individually and As Next Friend of C.W. vs. Aliyah Faith LeBlanc
Aug 27, 2024 |Motor Vehicle Accident - Over $250,000 |24-08-13257
Case
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Aug 27, 2024 |Motor Vehicle Accident - Over $250,000 |24-08-13203
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Aug 30, 2024 |Motor Vehicle Accident - Under $250,000 |24-08-13434
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Aug 26, 2024 |Motor Vehicle Accident - Over $250,000 |24-08-13089
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Aug 27, 2024 |Other Injury or Damage - Over $250,000 |24-08-13236
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Jose Salazar vs. Arnoldo M Ortiz
Aug 29, 2024 |Motor Vehicle Accident - Under $250,000 |24-08-13405
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Magaly Espinosa vs. Robert Haseman
Aug 26, 2024 |Motor Vehicle Accident - Over $250,000 |24-08-13102
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Jesus Carillo Barrera vs. Peggy M Thompson,Teddy J Thompson
Aug 29, 2024 |Other Injury or Damage - Over $250,000 |24-08-13399
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Aug 28, 2024 |Motor Vehicle Accident - Over $250,000 |24-08-13305
Ruling
Gaige vs. Greyhound Lines, Inc, et al.
Aug 28, 2024 |23CV-0203891
GAIGE VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0203891This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of removal. The matter was removed to Federal Court andon February 23, 2024, the Court found this matter to be exempt from case disposition goals under CRC3.714(c)(1). Due to the removal to Federal Court, the Court removes this matter from the Court’s control. TheCourt continues this Review Hearing to Monday, August 25, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63 for reviewregarding status of removal. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.
Ruling
ELIZONDO, AARON vs KCB VENTURES INC a)
Aug 29, 2024 |CV-21-001167
CV-21-001167 – ELIZONDO, AARON vs KCB VENTURES INC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant, KCB Ventures, Inc’s Responses to Request for Production, Set Nos. Two and Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions in the amount of $2,250.00 – GRANTED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant, Adcomm, Inc’s Responses to Requests for Production, Set Nos. Two and Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions in the amount of $2,250.00 – GRANTED.(a) The Court finds that Defendant KCB Ventures Inc. failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production propounded on November 21, 2022, and January 10, 2023, in spite of indications that said responses would be forthcoming.The Court accordingly finds that Defendant has waived all objections to said discovery including those based on work product and privilege. Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.300 (a) and (b)).Defendant is therefore ordered to provide code-compliant, objection-free responses to said discovery within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order.The Court also finds that said failure to respond is without substantial justification. The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to monetary sanctions of $100.00 for attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in bringing this motion. Said sanctions are payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within ten (10) days of the date of this order. (Civ Proc. Code §§2031.300(c); 2023, 010 (h); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a)).(b) The Court finds that Defendant ADCOMM Inc. failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production propounded on November 21, 2022, and January 10, 2023, in spite of indications that said responses would be forthcoming.The Court accordingly finds that Defendant has waived all objections to said discovery including those based on work product and privilege. Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.300 (a) and (b)).Defendant is therefore ordered to provide code-compliant, objection-free responses to said discovery within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order.The Court also finds that said failure to respond is without substantial justification and accordingly finds that Plaintiff is entitled to monetary sanctions of $1000.00 for attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in bringing this motion. Said sanctions are payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within ten (10) days of the date of this order. (Civ Proc. Code §§2031.300(c), 2023, 010 (h); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a)).
Ruling
KIMBERLY ANN GILES VS HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET AL.
Aug 27, 2024 |23STCV02833
Case Number: 23STCV02833 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 78 ¿ KIMBERLY ANN GILES, Plaintiff(s), vs. HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendant(s). Case No.:¿ 23STCV02833 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION TO QUASH SUMMONS In pro per Plaintiff Kimberly Ann Giles (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Housing Authority and Blanca Macris (collectively, Defendants) for alleged damages to personal property. Specially appearing Defendants move to quash service of the summons and complaint that was mailed to them. Defendant declares that there has been no attempt to serve by personal or substituted service. No proof of service of the summons and complaint has been filed by Plaintiff to date. However, the Court will not consider the motion on the merits until proper service of the motion has been effectuated. Defendant served Plaintiff with the moving papers by electronic service. Service by electronic service is authorized with conditions. Self-represented parties are to be served by non-electronic methods unless they affirmatively consent to electronic service (CRC Rule 2.251(c)(3)(B)). Further, CCP §1010.6(c) provides that a document may be served electronically to an unrepresented person by express consent. There is no evidence that Plaintiff expressly agreed to accept service by e-mail. Based on the foregoing, the motion is denied without prejudice. Moving Party is ordered to give notice. DATED: August 26, 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.
Ruling
GRACE ASANTE VS UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, ET AL.
Aug 29, 2024 |23LBCV01169
Case Number: 23LBCV01169 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: S25 Procedural Background On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc., Portier, LLC, Joseph Gallegos and Does 1 to 50. Plaintiff alleges that the action arises from an automobile collision that occurred on or about May 14, 2023, on Pacific Coast Highway, at or near Redondo Avenue, in the City of Long Beach (Incident). (Compl., ¶ 1.) On October 12, 2023, Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. and Portier, LLC (Uber Defendants) filed an answer. On April 22, 2024, the Court granted the parties stipulation, continuing the final status conference to October 4, 2024, the trial date to October 14, 2024, and all discovery and other pre-trial deadlines to be based from the new trial date. (April 22, 2024 Order.) On May 23, 2024, Defendant Joseph Gallegos (Defendant Gallegos) filed an answer. On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to file a first amended complaint (FAC). On August 15, 2024, Uber Defendants filed an opposition. On August 16, 2024, Defendant Gallegos filed a Joinder to Defendant Ubers opposition. On August 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Reply. Legal Standard Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 576.) As a condition of granting leave to amend, the trial court may require a plaintiff to bring a motion that is compliant with rule 3.1324 of the California Rules of Court (Rule 3.1324), including the evidentiary requirements, and doing so does not constitute an abuse of discretion. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.) A party requesting leave to amend must submit a motion which includes: (1) a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings; (2) a statement of which allegations would be deleted by the amendment, and where they are located in the previous pleading; and (3) a statement of what allegations would be added by the amendment, and where they are located in the proposed pleading. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324(a).) The motion must be accompanied by a declaration stating: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) why the request was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b).) Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488; see P & D Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345; Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 627, 649 [leave to amend properly denied where Plaintiff knew for over five months claims had not been properly pleaded and took no action to amend until after summary judgment granted against it]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 6:656.) Arguments Plaintiff seeks leave to file a FAC to include a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff argues that Code Civ. Proc., § 425.13, which governs professional negligence of a healthcare provider, Plaintiff is permitted it to file an amended complaint including a prayer for punitive damages. (See Neubauer Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1 [FAC] Prayer for Damages ¶ 3.) Further, Plaintiff seeks to add a paragraph regarding Defendant Gallegos driving under the influence based on information obtained from the police report regarding the Incident. (See Neubauer Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1 [FAC] ¶ 43.) Plaintiff asserts that she received facts giving rise to the amendment when Plaintiffs counsel received a police report on the Incident on September 25, 2023. (See Neubauer Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. 2 [Police Report].) Plaintiff also states that the request was not made earlier because the facts were learned after the filing of the original complaint and Defendant Gallegos only recently answered the original complaint on May 23, 2024. (See Neubauer Decl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff relies on Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 and Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82 in arguing that an allegation that driving a car intoxicated while intoxicated sufficiently met the malice requirement for punitive damages under Civ. Code, § 3294. (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 893-895; Dawes, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at pp. 88-89.) In opposition, Uber Defendants contend they will be prejudiced if the instant motion is granted. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488 [finding prejudice where amendments to the complaint proposed on the eve of trial, nearly two years after complaint originally filed, would require defendant to discover additional evidence and depose additional witnesses to prepare their defense on the newly proposed claims.]) Uber Defendants contend the request is untimely as: (1) the original complaint was filed on June 23, 2023; (2) Plaintiff received the police report containing information regarding a Defendant Gallegos alleged intoxication on September 25, 2023; (3) Defendant Gallegos filed an answer almost three months ago; (4) trial is currently set for January 28, 2025, and (5) Plaintiffs actions have already delayed resolution of this matter on several occasions (e.g. at the July 23, 2024 mediation, Plaintiff appeared but was not represented by an intern (not counsel) with no authority to negotiate, lack of noncompliance by Plaintiff forced Uber Defendants to file a motion to compel an Independent Medical Examination.) Uber Defendants argue that Code Civ. Proc., § 425.13 does not apply as it governs professional negligence of a healthcare provider. Uber Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs proposed amendments are merely conclusory and that if the instant motion is granted, Uber Defendants intends to file a demurrer arguing that the FAC does not sufficiently plead support claim of punitive damages. (See Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211 [clear and convincing evidence standard needed to demonstrate punitive damages requirement], see also (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b)) [With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.]) Defendant Gallegos joins in Uber Defendants opposition. No additional arguments are brought by Defendant Gallegos. In reply, Plaintiff states the instant motion was timely filed, Defendants have not made any showing of prejudice and Defendants argument regarding the proposed pleading is misplaced. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [Even if the proposed legal theory is a novel one, the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.]) Tentative Ruling Plaintiff has complied with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b). While a motion to permit an amendment to a pleading to be filed is one addressed to the discretion of the court, the exercise of this discretion must be sound and reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. Morgan v. Superior Ct. of Cal. In & For Los Angeles County (1959)172 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530. And it is a rare case in which a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case. If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) Defendants have established the level of prejudice to warrant a denial of Plaintiffs request to file a FAC. In Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488, prejudice was found in the complaint amendments the plaintiff proposed on the eve of trial because the defendants would need additional time to depose witnesses and discover evidence to oppose the additional allegations. Here, although trial is set for January 2025, Uber Defendants have not identified that similar level of prejudice aside from the costs of filing a demurrer and/or motion to strike to challenge the proposed amendments and the need for significant, if any, additional discovery. trial is set in January 2025, there is likely no need for significant, additional discovery or further depositions, which could a result in the need for a delay in the trial date. The Court agrees with Uber Defendants that Code Civ. Proc., § 425.13 is improper basis for Plaintiffs request to add punitive damages, as it only applies to professional negligence actions against healthcare providers; this action does not involve a healthcare provider, nor does it assert a professional negligence claim. The Court also acknowledges Defendants arguments as to potential legal and factual deficiencies of the allegations surrounding Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. In Taylor, in addition to the driver being under the influence, there were aggravating factors (prior DUI arrest, driver recently on probation for DUI, consuming alcohol while driving, and transporting alcohol as part of employment) relied upon by the Supreme Court in reversing the trial courts decision to sustain the demurrer. Yet, the legal and factual sufficiency of the claims in this present case do not render the amendments futile. [The preferable practice is to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings. Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Ct. (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048. Plaintiffs FAC is deemed filed as of the date of this ruling.
Ruling
BONNIE SUGERMAN VS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
Aug 27, 2024 |Echo Dawn Ryan |23STCV02152
Case Number: 23STCV02152 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 26 08/27/24 Dept. 26 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding SUGERMAN v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (23STCV02152) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Irving Meyer (Law Offices of Irving Meyer) Counsel for Defendant/moving party: Nazli Alimi (LAUSD Office of General Counsel); Thomas Hurrell, Lisa An (Hurrell Cantrall LLP) (1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (filed on 04/24/2024) (2) MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET fOUR) (filed on 01/16/2024) TENTATIVE RULING Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Depositions and Production of Documents, Set Four, is MOOT. I. BACKGROUND On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff Bonnie Sugerman (Plaintiff) brought this is FEHA discrimination and harassment action against defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (Defendant). Plaintiff alleges she was employed with Defendant for approximately 21 years and had to retire effective January 3, 2023, when she was approximately 59 years of age, because of Defendants alleged disability and/or age discrimination; failure to accommodate Plaintiffs disabilities; failure to enter into a reasonable interactive process with Plaintiff based on her disabilities; retaliation because Plaintiff had complained about prior FEHA violations by Defendant, as well as Plaintiff seeking to be accommodated for her disabilities. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she was on medical leave for open heart surgery, and Defendant refused to allow her to work in a virtual position even though there were virtual positions available. The complaint alleges causes of action for (1) discrimination and/or age discrimination (FEHA); (2) retaliation (FEHA); (3) failure to accommodate (FEHA); (4) failure to enter into interactive process (FEHA); and (5) disability harassment (FEHA). On April 24, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or alternatively, summary adjudication, arguing: · Defendant moves for summary judgment or adjudication on all Plaintiffs causes of action · ISSUE ONE: Plaintiff's Cause of Action for Disability and/or Age Discrimination under FEHA must be adjudicated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of disability and/or age discrimination, Defendant had legitimate business reasons for not providing Plaintiff with permanent remote work, and Plaintiff has no evidence of pretext. · ISSUE TWO: Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for Retaliation under FEHA must be adjudicated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of retaliation, Defendant had legitimate business reasons for not providing Plaintiff with permanent remote work, and Plaintiff has no evidence of pretext · ISSUE THREE: Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for Failure to Provide an Accommodation under FEHA must be adjudicated against Plaintiff based on each of the following grounds: 1) Plaintiff failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith and was the cause of the breakdown of the interactive process as she voluntarily retired despite being on an approved leave of absence and being offered a reasonable accommodation; 2) LAUSD did provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation and Plaintiff's truly desired accommodation of indefinite remote work was unreasonable; 3) Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of a Senior Office Technician; and 4) even if Plaintiff was entitled to an accommodation of remote work, LAUSD would suffer undue hardship if it were to provide Plaintiff with her requested accommodation. · ISSUE FOUR: Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Enter into an Interactive Process under FEHA must be adjudicated against Plaintiff because 1) LAUSD engaged in a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff; 2) Plaintiff cannot identify a reasonable accommodation that was available at the time LAUSD engaged in the interactive process with her; and 3) Plaintiff failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith and was the cause of the breakdown of the interactive process as she voluntarily retired despite being on an approved leave of absence and being offered a reasonable accommodation. · ISSUE FIVE: Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action for Disability Harassment under FEHA must be adjudicated against Plaintiff because Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of disability harassment. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Plaintiffs causes of action. Defendant filed a reply maintaining there is no triable issue as to any material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against all of Plaintiffs causes of action. On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Depositions and Production of Documents, Set Four. Plaintiff moves to compel the depositions of six of Defendants employees and production in response to Plaintiffs 15 requests for documents. On June 25, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition arguing Plaintiff failed to show good cause to compel the production of Plaintiffs overly broad and unduly oppressive document requests and the depositions of Defendants third party employees who have no nexus to Plaintiffs claims. Defendant filed a reply maintaining that Defendant is entitled to the discovery. II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(a).) Summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact. (Id., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also, Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).) The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidenceas through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing. But& the defendant must indeed present evidence." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 855 [italics in original].) In other words, all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action--for example, that the plaintiff cannot prove element¿X. (Id., at 853.) The court in Aguilar distilled summary judgment to a single proposition: If a party moving for summary judgment in any action . . . would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary judgment. In such a case . . . the court should grant the motion and avoid a . . . trial rendered useless by nonsuit or directed verdict or similar device. (Id. at 855.) As noted in Aguilar, the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) Thus, courts usually follow a three-step analysis: First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings . . . . [¶] Secondly, we determine whether the moving partys showing has established facts which negate the opponents claim and justify a judgment in movants favor. . . . [¶] When a . . . motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373, 385 [citation and footnote omitted].) Opposing parties must present substantial evidence in order to avoid summary judgment. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) In some instances&, evidence may be so lacking in probative value that it fails to raise any triable issue. (Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083-1084.) A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. (Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1286, disapproved on other grounds by Aguilar, supra, at 865; accord Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780 [If the plaintiff is unable to meet her burden of proof regarding an essential element of her case, all other facts are rendered immaterial.].) Courts construe the moving party's affidavits strictly, construe the opponent's affidavits liberally, and resolve doubts about the¿propriety¿of granting the motion in favor of the party opposing it. (Unilab Corp.v. Angeles-IPA (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 622, 636; internal citation omitted.) The court focuses on issue finding; it does not resolve issues of fact. The court seeks to find contradictions in the evidence, or inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, which raise a triable issue of material fact. (Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy, etc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 754; internal citation omitted.) "[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted when the facts are susceptible [of] more than one reasonable inference... (Rosas v. BASF Corp.¿(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1392.) B. Evidentiary Objections The Court rules on Defendants objections Nos. 1-17 to Plaintiffs evidence in support of her opposition as follows: Marshall Declaration (Nos. 1-6) · Nos. 1-6: Sustained (Improper legal conclusion, Improper bases for expert opinion, Evid. Code § 1520). Sugerman Declaration (Nos. 7-17) · Nos. 1-12, 14-17: Overruled. · No. 13: Sustained (Hearsay). C. Summary of Undisputed Material Facts Plaintiff was a Senior Office Technician ("Sr. OT") for Defendant LAUSD from 2002 until her retirement on January 3, 2023. (UMF, 1.) Between May of 2020 and January 21, 2021, Plaintiff was on an approved leave of absence to recover from her open heart surgery. (UMF, 6.) For the Spring of 2021, Principal Ford of Mark Twain Middle School provided Plaintiff with the following reasonable accommodations: 1) not lift anything more than 10 pounds; 2) work 4 hours on-site and 4 hours remotely; 3) have at least 6 feet between her and co-workers; and 4) not be required to stand for more than 10 minutes at any time. (UMF, 7.) Plaintiff was content with the reasonable accommodations. (UMF, 8.) In August of 2021, Dr. Ford advised Plaintiff that she could no longer safely accommodate her because Mark Twain MS needed a full time onsite Sr. OT to meet the demands of the school as students returned to campus. (UMF, 10.) On November 4, 2021, LAUSD approved Plaintiffs reasonable accommodation request for remote work with LAUSDs City of Angels for the remainder of the 2021 2022 school year. (UMF, 11.) Plaintiff worked remotely for LAUSD's City of Angels for the remainder of the 2021-2022 school year. (UMF, 12.) On March 23, 2022, LAUSD advised all Sr. OTs assigned to the City of Angeles Virtual Academy that the City of Angels Virtual Academy was closing after the 2021-2022 school year. (UMF, 13.) LAUSD advised Plaintiff that it was opening six new Thematic Virtual Academy schools (hereinafter, "Virtual Academies") for students who opt to continue with an online independent study program. (UMF, 15.) LAUSD advised that there would be remote and in-person positions for Sr. OTs based on student enrollment and LAUSDs needs and pending an approval of a request to continue the reasonable accommodation of remote work. (UMF, 16.) LAUSD instructed the Sr. OTs, including Plaintiff, to provide a statement of the requested accommodation along with supporting documentation from a medical provider. (UMF, 17.) For the 2022-2023 school year, only 18 Sr. OT positions were funded with the Virtual Academies. (UMF, 18.) From the 18 Sr. OT positions funded, six (6) Sr. OT positions were available for remote work assignment as a reasonable accommodation based on either a medical/disability need or sincerely held religious belief. (UMF, 19.) The six available Sr. OT remote positions for the Virtual Academies were filled on a first come first served basis to those employees who submitted documentation that supported their request. (UMF, 20.) On or around April 21, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Disability Management asking to work from home for the 2022-23 school year with doctors' notes from Dr. David J. Wallenstein and Dr. Ellen Rochman Kovacs, Ph.D. (UMF, 21.) Dr. Wallenstein stated, Plaintiff "has multiple medical conditions placing her at high risk for severe complications, including death, from COVID 19 infection. As such, please give consideration to allowing Ms. Sugerman to continue work remotely from home. (UMF, 22.) On June 15, 2022, LAUSD advised Plaintiff that effective July 20, 2022, she would be assigned to Paul Revere Charter Middle School. (UMF, 26.) On June 30, 2022, Mr. Raul Noe, Return to Work Specialist, advised Plaintiff that there were no vacant remote work positions for classified employees for the 2022-2023 school year. (UMF, 27.) Mr. Noe asked Plaintiff to reach out to the principal of Paul Revere to engage in a good faith interactive process to see if Paul Revere could accommodate her. (UMF, 28.) On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Thomas Iannucci, Principal of Paul Revere, requesting an accommodation to work remotely. (UMF, 29.) On July 13, 2022, Mr. Juan Gonzalez, Workers' Compensation & Reasonable Accommodation Manager, clarified to her that her accommodation request was not denied. Rather, if Paul Revere could not accommodate her, to submit Attachment A (Record of Interactive Process), Attachment B, (Reasonable Accommodation Application), and medical documentation with work limitations and the expected duration of her limitations. (UMF, 30.) On July 20, 2022, Principal Iannucci met with Plaintiff and told her that Plaintiff's position of a Ms. Sugerman what the material fact pertinent to the Sr. OT requires her to be on situation was without asking disposition of this Motion. California Rules of Court Rule campus to handle the receipt, filing and sending of student her for any input, suggestions, and/or comments. The 3.1350(f) does not permit disputes with "inferences" records and that these meeting last "5 minutes." An from facts in a Separate essential functions could not be done virtually. (UMF, 33.) On July 21, 2022, Plaintiff submitted Attachments A & B, and medical notes from Dr. Kovacs, Dr. Avila-Garibay and Dr. Wallenstein's same note as before. (UMF, 36.) On July 27, 2022, Mr. Noe advised Plaintiff that he and Mr. Juan Gonzalez reviewed the medical notes of Dr. Kovacs, Dr. Avila Garibay and Dr. Wallenstein and advised Plaintiff needed to provide additional medical documentation that addresses what you are unable to do at work, which is usually written as work restrictions and or work limitations that supports your requested accommodations. (UMF, 38.) On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff provided a doctor's note from Dr. Chen. (UMF, 39.) Dr. Chen's note, dated July 29, 2022, stated Plaintiff "has multiple medical conditions (including cardiac abnormalities requiring daily medication use, a history of open heart surgery, diabetes) placing her at high risk of severe complications including death from COVID19 infection. [Plaintiff] also has a history of bilateral knee osteoarthritis and states this significantly impacts her mobility and ability to stoop and lift at work." (UMF, 40.) Dr. Chen asked LAUSD to "please give consideration to allowing Ms. Sugerman to continue work remotely from home." (UMF, 41.) On September 22, 2022, Mr. Noe emailed Plaintiff memorializing their conversation on September 21, 2022, and after review of Dr. Chen's note, he advised Plaintiff that "the medical documentation should describe the nature, severity, and duration of the impairment, the activity or activities that the impairment limits, the extent to which the impairment limits employees ability to perform the activity or activities, and should substantiate why the request[] is reasonable. (UMF, 43.) On the same day, Mr. Noe advised her that LAUSD would not take any further action until she provided sufficient medical documentation with work limitations. (UMF, 44.) On September 29, 2022, Mr. Noe offered the following accommodation at Paul Revere: 1) work from a cubicle in an "almost isolated" office and be provided with PPEs and hand sanitizer and 2) she could stand up to place files in cabinets and sit in a chair to place files in lower drawers. (UMF, 45.) Mr. Noe also again asked Plaintiff to provide him with medical notes which supported her request for full time remote work. (UMF, 46.) On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence from July 20, 2022 to January 21, 2023. (UMF, 49.) LAUSD approved Plaintiffs leave of absence request. (UMF, 50.) On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff submitted her Classified Resignation/Retirement Form, indicating she was retiring effective January 3, 2023. (UMF, 51.) D. Third Cause of Action: Failure to Accommodate Defendant moves for summary adjudication as to the third cause of action for failure to accommodate. The essential elements of a failure to accommodate claim are: 1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by the FEHA; 2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions of the position); and 3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs disability. (Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 245, 256.)¿ [T]he employer cannot prevail on summary judgment on a claim of failure to reasonably accommodate unless it establishes through undisputed facts that 1) reasonable accommodation was offered and refused, 2) there simply was no vacant position within the employers organization for which the disabled employee was qualified and which disabled employee was capable of performing with or without accommodation, or (3) the employer did everything in its power to find a reasonable accommodation, but the informal interactive process broke down because the employee failed to engage in discussions in good faith. [Citation.] (King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 442.)¿ a. Defendants Initial Burden Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failure to accommodate cause of action fails on each of the following grounds: 1) Plaintiff failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith and was the cause of the breakdown of the interactive process as she voluntarily retired; 2) Defendant did provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation and Plaintiff's desired accommodation of indefinite remote work was unreasonable and would cause undue hardship to Defendant; and 3) Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of a Senior Office Technician. i. Plaintiff Failed to Engage in the Interactive Process First, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was the cause of the breakdown of the interactive process and she did not participate in good faith. In support, Defendant submits the declaration of Raul Noe, Defendants Return to Work Specialist. Mr. Noe states that he advised Plaintiff her medical notes did not describe the nature and severity of the impairment, the specific limitations, or the expected duration of her limitations. (Noe Decl. ¶¶ 12-14.) Mr. Noe states he told Plaintiff multiple times how she needed to cure the deficiencies. (Ibid.) However, Plaintiff never cured the deficiencies and on October 12, 2022 Plaintiff submitted her Classified Resignation/Retirement Form, indicating she was retiring. (Ibid., Defs Ex. 34.) Thus, Defendant asserts Plaintiff did not participate in the interactive process in good faith because she failed to present Defendant with medical notes that clarified and specified her medical restrictions. It is an employee's responsibility to understand his or her own physical or mental condition well enough to present the employer at the earliest opportunity with a concise list of restrictions which must be met to accommodate the employee. (Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 266.) In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's lack of good faith in the interactive process is further evidenced by her intention to retire in early 2023. As evidence, Defendant submits an email Plaintiff sent her co-worker Laveme Usher, on May 24, 2022, stating, "I really hope we all get to continue working from home because ... I am not going to go back into a school, ever, to work again. I am hoping that I will get to work at one of the new 6 virtual academies from home until I can retire in November. How scary these shootings (anywhere) are." (Defs Ex. 12; Pltfs Depo 171:5-25.) The Court finds Defendant has satisfied its initial burden on this ground. ii. Defendant provided Plaintiff with a Reasonable Accommodation Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's accommodation cause of action fails because Defendant provided Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation and Plaintiff's only desired accommodation was unreasonable. FEHA does not obligate an employer to choose the best accommodation or the specific accommodation a disabled employee or applicant seeks. [Citation.] It requires only that the accommodation chosen be reasonable. (Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1222 [citing Gov. Code § 12940, subds. (a) & (m)].) Employers are not required to provide an accommodation that is demonstrated to produce undue hardship, as defined under Gov. Code § 12926, subd. (u). (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (m)(1).) The employer or other covered entity shall consider the preference of the applicant or employee to be accommodated, but has the right to select and implement an accommodation that is effective for both the employee and the employer or other covered entity. (2 CCR § 11068, subd. (e).) Similarly, during the interactive process, The employer or other covered entity shall consider the preference of the applicant or employee to be accommodated, but has the right to implement an accommodation that is effective in allowing the applicant or employee to perform the essential functions of the job. (2 CCR § 11069, subd. (c)(8).) While a "reasonable accommodation" is undefined by statute, courts have defined it to mean "a modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions" of her job. (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 952, 986.) Defendant asserts that it provided Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation. On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff had submitted a doctors note stating that she has multiple medical conditions (including cardiac abnormalities requiring daily medication use, a history of open heart surgery, diabetes) placing her at high risk for severe complications, including death, from COVID-19 infection. [Plaintiff] also has a history of bilateral knee osteoarthritis and states this significantly impacts her mobility and ability to stoop and lift at work. (Defs Ex. 27.) Therefore, on September 29, 2022, Mr. Noe offered Plaintiff the following accommodation: 1) work from a cubicle in an "almost isolated" office and be provided with PPEs and hand sanitizer and 2) she could stand up to place files in cabinets and sit in a chair to place files in lower drawers. (Ex. 31; Noe Decl., ¶¶ 14-15.) Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was also reasonably accommodated on a temporary basis when Defendant approved her leave of absence from July 20, 2022 to January 21, 2023. [A] finite leave can be a reasonable accommodation under FEHA, provided it is likely that at the end of the leave, the employee would be able to perform his or her duties. (Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 226.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs desired accommodation of remote work for an indefinite period of time is unreasonable and would cause undue hardship on Defendant. In support, Defendant submits the declaration of Latsha Buck, the Executive Director with LAUSD for its Office of Virtual Academy and Educational Options Schools. Ms. Buck states that Defendant never had a permanent remote position. (Buck Decl. ¶ 10.) Defendant asserts that they were under no duty to make Plaintiffs temporary accommodation of remote work permanent as it would require it to create a position which has never existed. (Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.) The Court finds Defendant has satisfied its initial burden on these grounds. iii. Plaintiff could not Perform the Essential Functions of the Position Defendant also argues Plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of a Senior Office Technician. Defendant provides the following evidence. Thomas Iannucci, the Principal for Paul Revere Charter Middle School, supervises all the employees assigned to his school and states that on-site presence is an essential function of a Senior Office Technician. (Iannucci Decl. ¶ 4.) According to Mr. Iannucci, Seventy-five percent of the essential functions of a Sr. OT involve handling physical files at school (including confidential cumulative records for students), sending and/or receiving student records from other schools; entering data and generating reports on the computer, and responding to requests for information from employees or the general public. (Ibid.) Since Plaintiff requested to work remotely and Defendant provided evidence that being on site is an essential function of her position, Defendant has satisfied its initial burden on this ground. In sum, the Court finds that based on the evidence, Defendant has carried its initial burden of establishing that Plaintiff cannot prevail as a matter of law on the third cause of action for failure to accommodate. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of material fact. b. Plaintiffs Burden In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the offer of a cubicle was not a reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff submits her declaration as evidence. Plaintiff states: Mr. Noe never presented any evidence/proof to me from a medical provider, or any other qualified person that placing me in a "cubicle" would not put me at "at a high risk for severe complications, including death, from Covid-19 infection& In addition: For one, a cubicle is not as private as people think. It is in the shape of an office, however, there are no doors, a ceiling or is not a fully enclosed, private office. Air can easily travel through a cubicle. And... anyone can walk right into a cubicle. Also, even if people walked by my "cubicle" if someone sneezed or coughed at or near my cubicle... then someone's germs arc floating around and I could still get sick because of my health situations. The fact that a cubicle is more open and where someone could even walk into my space very easily was a drawback to me. I just could not chance being in a cubicle because there really was no privacy or room for safety where my health is/was concerned." (Sugerman Decl. ¶ 9.) Thus, Plaintiff contends that the accommodation offered by Defendant was not agreeable to her. However, Plaintiff does not establish a triable issue of material fact that the offered accommodation was not a reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Noe did not present evidence that the cubicle would not put her at risk. Yet, in Defendants reply, Defendant presents evidence that Plaintiff did not respond to Mr. Noes offer to seek further information or clarify her concerns of the proposed accommodation. (Noe Decl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff does not provide evidence that her medical providers advised her that the proposed accommodation would not sufficiently accommodate her. Instead, Plaintiff filed her leave of absence request shortly after on October 6, 2022 and then her retirement form on October 12, 2022. Thus, Plaintiff does not establish a triable issue of material fact that the offered accommodation was not a reasonable accommodation. Further, Plaintiff fails to address or dispute Defendants assertion that Defendants approval of her leave of absence request was also a reasonable accommodation. In Plaintiffs opposition she also argues that there were other available Senior Office Technician positions that Defendant did not tell Plaintiff about, but Plaintiff could have performed the essential functions those positions remotely. (Sugerman Decl., ¶ 5.) However, "essential functions" is not determined based upon the employee's view point, but rather from that of the employer's judgment. (Cal. Gov't Code, § 12926, subd. (f)(2)(A).) As Defendant stated, being on site is an essential function of her position. (Iannucci Decl. ¶ 4.) The Court does not find Plaintiff creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she could perform the essential functions of a Senior Office Technician. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff failed to prove a triable issue of material fact. Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary adjudication as to the third cause of action. E. Fourth Cause of Action: Failure to enter into Interactive Process Defendant moves for summary adjudication as to the fourth cause of action for failure to enter into interactive process. Defendant asserts that Defendant engaged in a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff to identify an effective reasonable accommodation. FEHA requires employers to timely engage in good faith interactive process with a disabled employee to determine effective reasonable accommodations in response to a request for reasonable accommodation. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 12940, subd. (n).) "To prevail on a claim under section 12940, subdivision (n) for failure to engage in the interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the time the interactive process should have occurred." (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1018- 1019.) "[I]f the [interactive] process fails, responsibility for the failure rests with the party who failed to participate in good faith. While a claim of failure to accommodate is independent of a cause of action for failure to engage in an interactive dialogue, each necessarily implicates the other." (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54 [internal citations omitted].) "FEHA requires an informal process with the employee to identify reasonable accommodations, not necessarily ritualized discussions." (Nealy, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 379.) Here, Plaintiffs Failure to Enter Into the Interactive Process cause of action is premised on the same conduct as her Failure to Accommodate cause of action. As discussed above, the Court found Plaintiff did not carry her burden of establishing a triable issue of material fact as to her Failure to Accommodate cause of action. Specifically, Defendant submitted evidence that Plaintiff did not participate in the interactive process in good faith. Mr. Noe requested Plaintiff to provide additional information in her medical notes. (Noe Decl. ¶¶ 12-14.) However, Plaintiff did not provide Mr. Noe with the requested information and instead requested a leave of absence and retired. (Ibid.) Defendant also submitted evidence that Plaintiff had intended to retire by early 2023 as evidenced by the email she sent her co-worker stating that she hoped she could work remotely until she retired in November. (Defs Ex. 12; Pltfs Depo 171:5-25.) Defendant carried its initial burden. Plaintiff did not address these arguments in her opposition. Thus, Plaintiff failed to carry her burden and establish a triable issue of material fact. Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS summary adjudication as to the fourth cause of action. F. First Cause of Action: Disability and/or Age Discrimination Defendant moves for summary adjudication as to the first cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie claim for discrimination under the FEHA. In any case, Defendant asserts that they had a legitimate business reason for the actions they took against Plaintiff. A plaintiff alleging discrimination must allege that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circ*mstance suggests discriminatory motive. (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.) To satisfy its initial summary judgment burden, moving party employer must either undermine an element of plaintiff's prima facie case by affirmatively negating it or showing plaintiff cannot prove it, or provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. (McGrory v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc.¿(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1523.) In the context of disability discrimination claims, the Courts of Appeal boil these prima facie elements down from four to three: that the plaintiff (1) suffered from a disability or was regarded as suffering from a disability, (2) could perform the essential duties of a job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability. (Glynn v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 47, 53 fn.1.)¿¿ A physical or medical disability constitutes a disability under FEHA when that physical or mental disability requires a limitation upon a major life activity. (Gov. Code. § 129261.1(c).) The limitation need not be a substantial one as required under the Federal Americans with Disabilities act of 1990. (Ibid.) As an initial matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's discrimination action on the basis of age and/or disability is barred as a matter of law. Under FEHA, an employee must exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the statute by timely filing a complaint with DFEH and must obtain from the Department a right to sue in order to proceed with a civil action based on the FEHA violation. (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 63.) Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs DFEH charge only claimed FEHA violations for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, engage in a good faith interactive process and retaliation. In support, Defendant cites to Plaintiffs DFEH complaint attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Complaint. However, Plaintiffs complaint with DFEH states Complainant was discriminated against because of complainants medical condition (cancer or genetic characteristic), age (40 and over), disability (physical, intellectual/developmental, mental health/psychiatric) and as a result of the discrimination was forced to quit, denied work opportunities or assignments, denied accommodation for a disability. (Compl., Ex. A.) Thus, the Court does not find Defendants argument persuasive and Defendant does not satisfy its initial burden on this ground. a. Plaintiff Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie claim for discrimination under the FEHA. First, Defendant asserts Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action. Adverse employment action must be substantial and detrimental, and can include refusal to promote, transfer of job duties, and reducing employees authority if the terms and conditions of employment are materially affected. (Yanowitz v. LOreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1060-1061.) Defendant contends that while Plaintiff alleges Defendant forced her to retire, Defendant presented evidence that Plaintiff had a pre-existing intention to retire in January of 2023 that predated any alleged wrongdoing by Defendant. (Defs Ex. 12; Pltfs Depo 171:5-25.) Moreover, Defendant asserts that a failure to accommodate an employees disability does not qualify as an adverse action underlying a discrimination or retaliation claim. (Doe v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 721, 73536.) As such, Defendants have met their burden of showing that no adverse employment action was taken. Next, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish a discriminatory motive. Defendant asserts Defendant had a legitimate business reason for not providing Plaintiff with remote work because the duties and responsibilities of a Sr. OT required in-person attendance and there were no other remote positions available. (Iannucci Decl. ¶ 4.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant has carried its initial burden. b. Plaintiffs burden In Plaintiffs opposition, she fails to establish a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff relies on the same argument in that Plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of her position remotely and that Defendants denial was discriminatory. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not created a triable issue of material fact that she could have performed the essential functions of her position remotely. The Court does not find Plaintiff has carried her burden. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary adjudication as to the first cause of action. G. Second Cause of Action: Retaliation Defendant moves for summary adjudication as to the second cause of action for retaliation. To show retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) adverse employment action, (3) retaliatory intent, and (4) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) Plaintiffs retaliation claim is premised on the same conduct as the disability discrimination claim. As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant subjected her to an adverse employment action. Therefore, the Court incorporates by reference its prior discussion of these same arguments with respect to the disability discrimination claim and, for the same reasons, finds summary adjudication of the second claim for retaliation appropriate. As such, summary adjudication as to the second cause of action in the Complaint for retaliation is GRANTED. H. Fifth Cause of Action: Disability Harassment Defendant moves for summary judgment as to the fifth cause of action on the ground that Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie claim for harassment based on disability. To establish a prima facie case for¿harassment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to unwelcome¿harassment; (3) the¿harassment¿was based on¿a protected characteristic; and (4) the¿harassment¿unreasonably interfered with his work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. (Thompson v. City of Monrovia¿(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 876.)¿¿The law prohibiting harassment is violated when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the¿conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.¿(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 263 [internal quotations¿and brackets¿omitted].) A single incident of harassment may be enough to constitute a hostile work environment if it unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.¿ (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (b).)¿ The court shall use the totality of the circ*mstances to determine whether there exists a hostile work environment.¿ (Gov. Code, § 12923, subd. (c).)¿ Where the evidence establishes that Plaintiff did not endure conduct "so severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of his employment," summary judgement is appropriate. (McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association (2013) 216 Cal. App. 4th 283, 294.) The Complaint alleges: As a proximate result of Defendant's harassment, Plaintiff suffered adverse employment actions as a result of harassment in that Sugerman was not accommodated, not given the opportunity to have a reasonable interactive process, and was forced to resign from a job she had with the District for approximately twenty-one (21) years. (Compl. ¶ 49.) Defendant argues that there is no evidence that anyone from LAUSD subjected Plaintiff to harassment. Defendant points to Plaintiffs deposition in which she states no one at LAUSD encouraged or demanded that she retire. (Ex. 2, Sugerman Depo. 103:16-18, 104:13-14, 17-22.) While Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that she was harassed in that she was not accommodated or provided a reasonable interactive process, the Court does not find that this constitutes harassing conduct. Moreover, as discussed above, the Court finds that Defendant established that Plaintiff was provided a reasonable accommodation and interactive process. The Court finds that Defendant has carried its initial burden as to this cause of action. Plaintiff does not appear to address this argument in her opposition or identify the specific harassing conduct by Defendant. Thus, Plaintiff fails to create a triable issue of material fact regarding her fifth cause of action. In sum, the Court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show Defendant did not engage in harassing conduct. Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of raising triable issues of material fact. As such, summary adjudication for the fifth cause of action in the Complaint for disability harassment is GRANTED. I. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Depositions and Production of Documents, Set Four As discussed above, the Court grants Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. In light of the Courts ruling, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is Moot. III. DISPOSITION Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Depositions and Production of Documents, Set Four, is MOOT.
Ruling
NOLASCO vs DOE
Aug 29, 2024 |CVPS2304815
Motion to Compel Further Responses toForm Interrogatories, SpecialInterrogatories, Request for Admissions, andCVPS2304815 NOLASCO vs DOERequest for Production of Documents, SetOne, by Plaintiffs MARIO CARREONNOLASCO, ELENA CORIA CARREONTentative Ruling: Grant. No opposition was filed. Defendants Issa Ababseh and Randy Ababseh areordered to serve further verified responses to Plaintiffs’ Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories,Requests for Admissions, and Requests for Production (all Set One), within 30 days of service of noticeof this order. The objection-only responses do not appear to be justified on their face, and as there wasno timely opposition filed, the Ababsehs have not attempted to explain the basis for these objections, ifany. No substantive responses were provided. As this motion was required to obtain compliance withbasic discovery obligations, Issa Ababseh and Randy Ababseh are ordered to within 30 days payPlaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys fees and costs of $1660.
Ruling
Ramsour vs. Applewood Operating Company, LLC, et al.
Aug 26, 2024 |23CV-0202797
RAMSOUR VS. APPLEWOOD OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0202797This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of mediation. On April 15, 2024, this Courtgranted Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue MSC and Trial Dates as the parties planned to proceed withmediation. No status report has been filed. Given that Defendants filed an answer to the FirstAmended Complaint on August 20, 2024, it appears this matter is now at issue and a new MSCand Trial Date can now be set. The case, originally filed 7/25/23, will be well beyond the Courtspreferred case disposition deadline. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to discussstatus and trial setting.
Ruling
RAQUEL SALOMON VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
Aug 29, 2024 |Renee C. Reyna |21STCV35938
Case Number: 21STCV35938 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 29 Salomon v. City of Los Angeles 21STCV35938 Motion to be Relieved as Counsel, filed by Plaintiffs Counsel Erick B. Novik, Esq. and Kevin Salute, Esq. Tentative The motion to be relieved is GRANTED. Background On September 29, 2021, Raquel Salomon (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against City of Los Angeles, 7353 Milwood Avenue, Elkana Arik Aharoni aka Arik Aharoni, and Does 1 through 100 for general negligence and premises liability arising out of a trip and fall on the sidewalk at 7353 Milwood Avenue in Canoga Park on October 19, 2020. On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendant for the same causes of action. On February 2, 2023, City of Los Angeles filed an answer and cross-complaint against Arik Aharoni and 7353 Milwood Avenue. On August 6, 2024, Erick B. Novik, Esq. and Kevin Salute, Esq. of Novik Law Group (Counsel) filed this motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard The court may order that an attorney be changed or substituted at any time before or after judgment or final determination upon request by either client or attorney and after notice from one to the other. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 284(b).) An attorney is permitted to withdraw where conflicts between the attorney and client make it unreasonable to continue the representation. (See Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct 3-700(C)(1).) The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Manfredi & Levine v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1133.) An application to be relieved as counsel must be made on Judicial Counsel Form MC-051 (Notice of Motion and Motion) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(a)), MC-052 (Declaration) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.136(c)), and MC-053 (Proposed Order) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e)). Further, the requisite forms must be served on the client and all other parties who have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d).) The court may delay effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) Discussion Counsel has filed the Notice, Declaration and Order to be Relieved as Counsel. Counsel has served Plaintiff at her last known address and has made substantial efforts to locate her. All substantive and procedural requirements for the motion are satisfied. There has been a complete breakdown of communication between Plaintiff and Counsel, and Plaintiff has not made any effort to keep Counsel informed of her contact information over a prolonged period of time. In these circ*mstances, Counsel cannot be expected to continue to represent Plaintiff. For good cause shown, the motion is GRANTED. Conclusion The motion to be relieved as counsel is GRANTED. The order is effective upon the filing of a proof of service showing service of the signed order on Plaintiff at her last known address. Moving counsel to give notice.
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